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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper will consider the scope to develop an approach to global media and communication that is 
informed by cultural-economic geography. I refer to cultural-economic geography as that strand of 
research in the field of geography that has been informed on the one hand by the ‘cultural turn’ in both 
geographical and economic thought, and which focuses on the relationship between, space, knowledge and 
identity in the spheres of production and consumption, and on the other to work by geographers that has 
sought to map the scale and significance of the cultural or creative industries as new drivers of the global 
economy. Representative writers in this field include Allen J. Scott, Meric Gertler, Michael Storper, Ash 
Amin and Nigel Thrift. The work of Michael Curtin on media capitals is also relevant to this emergent 
research paradigm, as is the work on clustering and spatial agglomeration in cultural production sectors.  
 
I wish to propose that cultural-economic geography provides us with ways of thinking about the shifting 
interscalar relations of global media and communication that overcome some of the impasses of political 
economy, while remaining focused upon the dynamics of capital accumulation and economic structure. In 
particular, I would argue that the rise of new media capitals outside of the US-Europe axis necessitate a 
rethinking of the political economy of global media that moves beyond structuralist accounts of core-
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periphery dynamics to recognize the scope for a multi-polar and multi-scalar global economic geography 
of media production and consumption. At the same time, they question some of the easy assumptions of 
globalization literature, most notably around the transformative impact of global media flows and new 
technologies in dissolving geographically marked places into an a-spatial networked global system.  
 
At one level the introduction of geographical perspectives into global media and communication studies 
should not be problematic, as recognition of the spatiality of media production and consumption is a core 
feature of a materialist approach to the study of media. However, global media studies has long been 
reliant upon a top-won approach to understanding global media, that sees particular media environments 
as subject to the accumulatory logic of global media corporations. This paper will argue that recent work 
from a cultural-economic perspective allows for a fuller recognition of the significance of culture, policy 
and the relationships between global and nationally based capitals in shaping the topography of the global 
media environment.  
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Cultural Economic Geography and Global Media Studies 
 
Global media studies has been shaped historically by the clash between modernization 
theories of the media, which envisage a global diffusion of hegemonic media institutions, 
content and structures that will benefit all societies that participate, and critical political 
economy, where the focus has been on the reproduction over time of relationships of 
domination and dependency. Over the 1990s and 2000s, many of the core propositions of 
critical political economy were challenged by theorists working from cultural studies 
perspectives, particularly in the assumptions that were made about media audiences and 
their relationship to content from the major exporters (Tomlinson, 1991; Ang, 1996), and 
the capacity of media from non-dominant nations to develop significant export markets as 
well as remaining hegemonic in their national media systems in spite of greater 
competition from global media conglomerates (Sinclair et. al., 1995; Straubhaar, 1997). It 
would be fair to say, however, that a cultural studies paradigm for studying global media 
has never ultimately emerged, due in part to the historic association of cultural studies 
with the critical analysis of national cultures (Ang and Stratton, 1996). Like globalization 
theories, which emerged out of the social sciences in the 1990s, cultural studies has 
tended to take a “bower-bird” approach to the filed, acquiring an eclectic range of 
insights from field such as anthropology (Appadurai, 1990) and postcolonial theories 
(McMillin, 2007). Much of the best known work in global media studies continues to be 
derived from critical political economy, as seen in the contributions of authors such as 
Dan Schiller, Robert McChesney and Toby Miller.  
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The political economy approach to global media has prided itself on being empirical and 
evidence-based, drawing upon a wide range of source material on trends in media 
ownership, global media trade, revenues earned in different media markets, changing 
systems of media production, and trends in media policy (see e.g. Schiller and 
McChesney, 2004; Miller et. al., 2005). At the same time, many of the trends identified 
by these authors exist alongside counter-trends that provide some basis for questioning 
the universality of claims made about how media is developing on an international scale. 
There are three in particular that can be identified as pointing to the need to at least 
broaden the range of interpretative frameworks that are being used to comprehend the 
complex realities of global communications media.  
 
First, claims about the strengthening hegemony of “Global Hollywood” in international 
film and television markets (e.g. Miller et. al., 2005) co-exist with arguments that the 
dynamics of many national media systems and institutions have in fact been 
strengthening over the last 20-30 years, and that we are in fact in the twilight phase of 
U.S. media dominance (Curtin, 2007; Straubhaar, 2008; Tunstall, 2007). Second, while 
many political economists present control over intellectual property as the basis for 
maintaining relations of dominance and dependency in an era of increasingly 
internationalized media production, through a separation of the labour of production from 
that of conception (Miller et. al., 2005), others argue that the international media and 
cultural production landscape is in fact becoming more diverse and decentralised with the 
emergence of new media capitals outside of the U.S-Europe axis (Curtin, 2008; Scott, 
2008). The economic geographer Allen Scott has argued that ‘the further intensification 
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of globalization processes may well be associated with a markedly more polycentric 
system of cultural production than in the recent past’, and that ‘globalization does not 
appear to be leading to overall cultural uniformity so much as it is to a polycentric pattern 
of production on the supply side and increasing variety of options on the demand side’ 
(Scott, 2008: 317). Finally, the claims that globalization was associated with media 
policy convergence under the general sign of ‘neo-liberal globalization’ or ‘neo-liberal 
capitalism’ (Scholte, 2005; McGuigan, 2005; Freedman, 2008) and a retreat of the 
nation-state from the management of national media systems is open to question, 
particularly in fast-expanding markets in Asia and the Middle East (Thomas, 2006).  
 
It is in light of such questions that I wish to argue that cultural economic geography 
offers significant insights and ways forward for global media and communications 
studies. In referring to cultural economic geography, I am following James et. al. (2007) 
in understanding cultural economic geography as arising at the intersection of three 
trends: (1) the ‘cultural turn’ in economic geography arising from critiques of the Marxist 
political economy tradition that dominated the field in the 1970s and 1980s; (2) the 
‘cultural economy’ literature that sees the economic and cultural spheres as increasingly 
interpenetrated in spatial relations; and (3) the rise of industries that primarily trade in 
knowledge and symbols, and the tendencies of such industries to cluster in particular 
urban locations.  
 
The focus of geography upon the spatial dimensions of social relations, and the spatially 
grounded dimensions of everyday life and social interaction, can provide an important 
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perspective from which to analyze the scope, dimensions and impacts of global media. 
Indeed, affinities have existed between the critical political economy tradition of media 
studies and radical economic geography, around the relationship between cultural 
domination and dependency and world systems or dependency theories of capitalism 
(Schiller, 1976). Economic geography as a field was strongly influenced in the 1970s and 
1980s by Marxist political economy, as authors such as Manuel Castells (1978), David 
Harvey (1982) and Neil Smith (1990) sought to reconstruct the Marxist critique of 
capitalism in explicitly spatial terms. Yet there was an inherent tension in Marxist 
historical geography between working with analytical categories that existed prior to their 
constitution in space (mode of production, social classes, capital accumulation etc.), and 
the foundational assumption of geographers that all social relations were inherently 
spatial. As Doreen Massey observed at the time, ‘if we really mean that it is impossible to 
conceptualise social processes and structures outside their spatial form and spatial 
implications, then the latter must also be incorporated into our initial formulations and 
definitions’ (Massey, 1985: 18).  
 
Several responses emerged to this challenge. One was to draw upon the Regulationist 
School of political economy that emerged in France, which sought to locate the 
institutional manifestations of capitalist social relations in particular historical and 
geographical contexts, enabling researchers to move beyond speaking of capitalism in the 
singular to capitalisms that were spatially grounded and ‘inflected with different social 
and cultural resonances in different localities, and that these resonances are directly 
implicated in the organization of economic life and modalities of economic calculation’ 
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(Scott, 2004a: 488). Regulation theory provided a means of articulating differences 
between national capitalisms, as well as shifts occurring within capitalism, such as the 
turn from mass production to flexible production networks, and from the national space 
to globalization. It also enabled insights to be gleaned from the ‘new institutionalism’ in 
the social sciences, which drew attention both to the centrality of institutions to all 
aspects of economic life and the social embeddedness of economic relations (Martin, 
2008). These shifts gave a new centrality to cultural factors in political economy, ranging 
from greater recognition of the need to explicitly consider the dynamics of consumption 
rather than approaching it as the subordinate entity to production (Slater, 2003), the 
question of whether there had been a shift within capitalism from “organized” or Fordist 
to “disorganized” or flexible capitalism and its implications for politics, class formation 
and the nation-state (Lash and Urry, 1987), to David Harvey’s ambitious attempt to 
identify postmodernism as the ‘cultural logic’ of flexible capitalism (Harvey, 1989).  
 
A more radical conception of the economy/culture relationship argues that the categories 
are increasingly merging into one another, to the point where it is increasingly necessary 
to speak of a cultural economy. It has long been observed that there has been a 
commodification or an industrialization of culture in 20th century capitalism, and a 
governance of cultural industries on the basis of commercial logics, with the mass media 
being the most common point of reference for such developments. What is proposed in 
the ‘cultural turn’ in economic geography is that ‘economic categories are themselves 
discursively as well as materially constructed, practiced and performed at different spatial 
scales’ (James et. al., 2007). The influence of poststructuralist thinking is apparent here, 
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and Michel Foucault in particular has been central to new approaches to economic 
geography, particularly his observations that ‘Space is fundamental in any form of 
communal life [and] space is fundamental in any exercise of power’ (Foucault, 1984: 
252), and that ‘the present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space’ (Foucault, 
1986: 22). The growing imbrication of culture and economy is connected to the rise of 
service industries and the emphasis placed upon the relational dimensions of economic 
transactions in these sectors, but is also seen in the turn in business management towards  
‘“corporate culture” as a means of restructuring the ways employees think and behave 
creatively in the pursuit of improved organizational performance’ (James et. al., 2007).  
 
The cultural economy literature is wide-ranging and hotly debated (see e.g. du Gay and 
Pryke, 2003; Amin and Thrift, 2007; for a critique, see Scott, 2004a). It is perhaps most 
widely acknowledged to have transformed the study of consumption, which had long 
been a fundamental point of distinction between economists, who saw consumer 
preferences as being formed prior to and independently of the appearance of goods and 
services in the market, and a variety of cultural studies, social science and 
anthropological traditions that have emphasized the relationship between the 
consumption of commodities and questions of status, meaning and identity. It is now 
widely acknowledged that ‘consumption has come to represent the site on which culture 
and economy most dramatically converge’ (Slater, 2003: 149).  
 
The centrality of culture to systems of economic production is perhaps more hotly 
debated among economic geographers, but Meric Gertler (2003) has pointed to three ‘big 
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ideas’ that have given increasing significance to a cultural economic geography of 
production. First, the reorganization of corporate production models away from vertical 
integration and towards ‘flexible specialisation’ and global production networks has 
drawn attention to both the economic advantage of geographical proximity between 
producers, suppliers, distributors, specialist workers and intermediaries such as specialist 
legal and financial service providers. Second, shifts in innovation models away from 
linear ‘ideas-push’ approaches (ideas are developed in research and development labs, 
and then applied in the market by firms), towards models that derive their strength from 
interaction between suppliers, producers and users (Dodgson et. al. 2002), have focused 
attention on the importance of geographical clustering to innovation. As a result, there 
has been a growing interest in why particular regions become innovative, and how a 
propensity for innovation becomes embedded in particular regional cultures, through 
what Storper (1997) refers to as untraded interdependencies. Finally, the concept of path 
dependency in technology development and design (David 1985; Arthur 1999), combined 
with the significance of increasing returns to scale in economic theory (Krugman 2000), 
have drawn attention to the cumulative advantages that can accrue to regions from 
achieving early leadership in particular industries. Gertler notes that ‘once a region 
establishes itself as an early success in a particular set of production activities, its chances 
of continued growth are very good indeed’ (Gertler 2003: 135). In order to achieve 
cumulative growth over time, there are typically a supportive set of accompanying social, 
institutional and cultural factors at play within a particular region; at the same time, these 
socio-cultural and institutional factors may also present difficulties in reversing regional 
decline.  
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Finally, there is the extent to which industries and firms that are directly engaged with the 
production and consumption of culture – whether as knowledge-intensive or 
entertainment-based symbolic forms – have moved to the centre of contemporary global 
capitalism. This needs to be broken down into two parts. The first concerns the rise of the 
cultural or creative industries themselves, which are now estimated to constitute 7-9 per 
cent of the Gross Domestic Product of the United States, and 3-5 per cent of GDP of 
other OECD economies. The second is the extent to which characteristics of these 
industries merge into the rest of the economy, as capitalism becomes more knowledge-
intensive, design-intensive and oriented towards niche consumer markets (Lash and Urry, 
1994). One of the reasons why the size, scope and nature of the creative industries can be 
difficult to define, in ways that are more marked than was the case for the arts industries 
or the media industries, is because the line between ‘symbolic’ and ‘material’ goods is 
itself increasingly shifting. Allen Scott has observed that ‘One of the peculiarities of 
modern capitalism is that the cultural economy continues to expand … as an expression 
of the incursions of sign-value into ever-widening spheres of productive activity as firms 
seek to intensify the design content and styling of their outputs in the endless search for 
competitive advantage’ (Scott, 2004b, pp. 462-463). This parallels the tendency among 
consumers experiencing rising levels of affluence to increasingly seek ‘goods and 
services that provide entertainment and distraction, forms of personal ornamentation, 
modes of self display, sources of information and self-awareness, and … whose symbolic 
value to the consumer is high relative to their purely practical purposes’ (Scott, 2008: 
308).  
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The work of Allen Scott has played a vital role in understanding the cultural-economic 
dynamics of contemporary creative industries. Scott’s work on the cultural economy of 
cities (Scott, 2000) identified five major features of the creative industries – or what he 
terms the cultural-products industries – that promote both network organization and 
clustering and agglomeration in particular cities and regions: 
 
1. The importance of specific forms of labour input, that possess specialist tacit 
knowledge and whose skills can be acquired on a flexible, just-in-time basis; 
2. The organization of production in dense networks of small-to-medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) that are strongly dependent upon each other for the provision 
of specialized inputs and services; 
3. Employment relations that are frequently characterized by intermittent, project-
based work, which promotes co-location of industries and workers in particular 
areas, in order to reduce transaction costs and search costs; 
4. Indirect, synergistic benefits that result from the co-existence of many people and 
enterprises engaged in inter-related activities, such as the enhanced capacity to 
match individual creativity to market opportunity; 
5. The development of associated services and institutional infrastructure such as 
specialist intermediaries (e.g. entertainment lawyers) and a supportive public 
policy environment.  
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Scott identifies Hollywood – or, more accurately, the region of southern California 
centred around Los Angeles – as the exemplar of locational clustering and agglomeration 
in the global media and entertainment industries. The break-up of the Hollywood studio 
system after World War II saw the externalization of a range of in-house activities, 
leading to a more diffuse organizational system of production, characterized by project-
based work and the intensification of clustering of firms in industries and activities 
related to film and television production in greater Los Angeles, as ‘the relations between 
firms cannot be planned over extended periods of time so that inter-firm contacts need to 
be constantly programmed and reprogrammed’ (Scott, 2005: 7). At the same time, the 
instability of these networks – perhaps paradoxically – reinforces the durability of the 
localized production system, with the result that Hollywood remains a magnet for 
creative people from around the world, and as a result, ‘new aptitudes flow continuously 
… from outside, thus helping to enlarge production capacities and to refresh pools of 
talent’ (Scott, 2005: 7). Hollywood is thus not only an attractor to those seeking to apply 
their skills in film and television (actors, director, scriptwriters etc.), but also to a related 
set of adjunct and associated industries, ranging from fashion to marketing, and digital 
visual effects to restaurants and catering. Moreover, successful creative industries clusters 
such as Hollywood ‘accumulate place-specific cultural associations as the symbologies 
embedded in goods and services produced in the same area are absorbed into the local 
urban landscape’ (Scott 2005: 7). Whether it is the touristy perceptions of Hollywood as 
the ‘home of the stars’, or the more dystopian landscapes of films such as The Terminator 
and Blade Runner, the association of Hollywood with cinema impacts upon the shape of 
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the city, its global cultural connotations, its self-image, and its attractiveness as a 
destination for creative workers of various kinds.  
 
Cultural-economy geography raises important questions about the durability and 
transferability of creative industries models from one place to another. On the one hand, 
it provides correctives to the automatic association of economic globalization with a ‘race 
to the bottom’, as globally mobile multinational capital plays off one place against 
another in order to drive down wages, working conditions and environmental standards. 
Storper (1997) notes that while the ‘off-shoring’ of work to low-wage economies, 
runaway production and a more polarized new international division of labour is one 
possible scenario arising from economic globalization, it exists alongside what he refers 
to as territorialized economic development, or ‘economic activity that is dependent on 
territorially specific resources’ (Storper, 1997: 170). Territorialized production is that 
where product and services are not standardized, quality is prioritized by consumers and 
not only price, and production processes rely upon both specialist labour inputs and 
untraded interdependencies, or ‘conventions, informal rules, and habits that coordinate 
economic actors under conditions of uncertainty … [and] constitute region-specific 
assets’ (Storper, 1997: 4-5). At the same time, concept from critical economic geography 
such as uneven development serve as reminders of the limits of replication of models 
derived from success stories elsewhere, to be ‘the new Hollywood’ or the ‘next Silicon 
Valley’, in an environment of ‘heightened inter-place competition’ (Harvey 1989: 295), 
and where already successful cities and regions possess considerable advantages in global 
competition based upon place competitiveness.  
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Michael Curtin’s Playing to the World’s Biggest Audience 
 
Michael Curtin’s Playing to the World’s Biggest Audience: The Globalization of Chinese 
Film and TV (Curtin, 2007) marks out an ambitious attempt to “think spatially” about 
how capital, culture, creative production and media policy intersect in the contemporary 
audiovisual space, and to develop an angle on it that is not framed primarily by the 
dynamics of English-language, North American media. The book seeks to identify the 
much-noted cultural dynamism of the audiovisual industries of what can loosely be 
termed “Greater China” (the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan) and 
how its cultural products are simultaneously being shaped by the desire “to refashion 
Chinese narratives for a Westernized global audience”, but also to reach “Chinese 
audiences around the global [that] are growing daily in numbers, wealth, and 
sophistication” (Curtin, 2007: 1).  
 
While Curtin’s account draws upon the various critiques of media imperialism and 
cultural imperialism theories arising from cultural studies, globalization theories and 
postcolonial studies (Curtin, 2009), Playing to the World’s Biggest Audience differs from 
those accounts of global media that question media imperialism by uncovering evidence 
of “contra-flow” or the capacity of non-Western media products to reach Western media 
audiences, in that its focus is upon the Chinese-speaking regions of East Asia as 
developing as a discrete regional media space with its own dynamics of capital 
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accumulation, creative migration and socio-cultural variation, which challenges the 
hegemony of Global Hollywood not directly through box office figures in North 
American and European markets (although the box office success of films such as 
Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon and Hero draws attention to this), but rather as 
constituting new sites of media capital whose dynamism exceeds that of Hollywood. 
Connecting film and TV to other industries where U.S. dominance was once 
unquestioned, Curtin speculates on whether: 
 
Hollywood today is nevertheless very much like Detroit forty years ago, a factory 
town that produces big bloated vehicles with plenty of chrome. As production 
budgets mushroom, quality declines in large part as a result of institutional inertia 
and a lack of competition. Like Detroit, Hollywood has dominated for so long that 
many of its executives have difficulty envisioning the transformations now on the 
horizon. Because of this myopia, the global future is commonly imagined as a 
world brought together by homogeneous cultural products produced and circulated 
by American media (Curtin, 2007: 4).  
 
It is important to be clear that the media space that Curtin is referring to is one that is 
discrete, but not autonomous. As Curtin notes, ‘the Chinese film industry … has operated 
transnationally for much of its history’ (Curtin, 2007: 269). Moreover, very significant 
elements of the Chinese media system developed without creative input from nor access 
to audiences in mainland China, most notably the Hong Kong studio system as it 
developed in its “golden age” from the 1960s to the early 1990s. This parallels Yeung’s 
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(2004) observation that a distinctive “Chinese capitalism” has evolved despite the 
People’s Republic of China being largely closed to outside commercial influences from 
1949 to the Deng Xiaoping era of gaige kaifeng (“reform and opening up”) in the late 
1970s.  To this day, Chinese film and TV continues to be shaped by two competing 
dynamics: the clear aspirations of the major global media conglomerates such as News 
Corporation, Time-Warner, Disney and Viacom to expand their presence in Asian 
markets that are seen as the fastest growing in the world; and the myriad complexities of 
dealing with the Chinese state in developing investment and co-production arrangements 
or seeking to release films or broadcast TV content to mainland Chinese audiences 
(Curtin, 2007: 192-210 on STAR TV and Phoenix TV in China; cf. Wang, 2008 on 
CCTV).  
 
Curtin’s work identifies four key variables that shape the spatial dimensions of media and 
the emergence of media capitals. First, there is the logic of accumulation. The classic 
capitalist logic of accumulation, identified by classical political economists such as Adam 
Smith and Karl Marx, as well as geographers such as David Harvey (2005), is to seek 
concentration of production resources and to maximize the extension of markets, in order 
to realize the greatest possible returns on investment in the shortest period of time. These 
centripedal tendencies in the sphere of production and centrifugal tendencies in 
distribution promote the rise of clusters of production on the one hand, and relentless 
pressures for geographical expansion by companies on the other. Such dynamics are 
central to the rise of Hollywood as the quintessential media and creative cluster whose 
cultural products have global reach (Scott, 2005), but can be identified with second-tier 
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media capitals such as Mumbai, Cairo and Hong Kong, which have developed 
distributional reach through privileged access for their products through territorially and 
linguistically related regions.  
 
Second, there are trajectories of creative migration. The clustering of media production 
into media capitals means that these urban locations act as “talent magnets” for particular 
types of creative workers. While this has been well documented by authors such as Allen 
Scott (2000), Richard Florida (2005) and others writing about creative cities (eg. Tay, 
2005), Curtin identifies a weakness of this literature as being a lack of consideration of 
the significance of political stability or expressive freedom for creative workers as a 
driver of such migration. This may not be such an issue where the competition is for 
creative workforce within nation-states (Chicago or Los Angeles? London or 
Manchester?), but it has certainly been a factor in the rise of Hong Kong as a destination 
for Mandarin-speaking creative workers. It is also a very pertinent consideration in the 
aspirations of other East Asian urban centres to become leading creative cities, such as 
Beijing, Shanghai, Taipei and Singapore.  
 
The third set of factors Curtin identifies are forces of sociocultural variation. Both the 
film and television industries have been strongly shaped by legal, institutional and policy 
frameworks that have for the most part been nationally based, although strongly 
influenced by international developments. In the area of film, the phenomenal global 
success of Hollywood cinema from the 1920s onwards meant that governments in many 
parts of the world prioritized the development of a national film industry as a 
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countervailing force to Hollywood as well as an outlet for the creative expression of 
national culture. Governments were even further implicated in the development of 
television, as they were required to provide basic infrastructure for broadcasting and to 
adjudicate on who could hold a licence to broadcast. In many parts of the world, this 
involved the development of a public service monopoly, or a strong public service 
broadcaster that was to be a conduit for national culture, values and information. This is 
complicated greatly by the ways in which communications technologies, global media 
economics and popular audience preferences promote access to imported television 
material – particularly from the United States – meaning that many national television 
systems develop in a relationship of what Joseph Straubhaar (2008) terms assymetrical 
interdependence. They are neither fully independent nor fully subject to cultural 
domination: rather, the relationship between local and imported media content shifts over 
time, with the imported content acting as a force that helps to shape local media 
production. 
 
Finally, the re is the role played by national media policies. From the 1980s in particular, 
with the development of cable and satellite television and the popularization of the 
Internet, media has been seen as being increasingly subject to dynamic forces associated 
with globalization (Schiller and McChesney, 2003). Contrary to perceptions that this 
equals the end of the nation-state and the slide of national cultures into cultural 
homogenization, it remains the case, as Govil (2009) argues, that ‘the national remains a 
powerful mode for engaging the spatial and temporal practices that organize the 
contemporary media industries across varied economies of scale’ (Govil, 2009: 149). The 
 19 
national space remains central to defining the legal and institutional conditions of 
production and reception (ownership laws, content regulations, intellectual property, 
communications infrastructures), it provides a repertoire of vernacular forms that mark 
out media content as belonging to particular places and cultures, and it anchors particular 
media industries to media capitals and to governments who can provide supporting ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ infrastructure for the further development of media production.  
 
Curtin’s aim in developing this framework is to expand upon the concept of media capital 
in a way ‘that at once acknowledges the spatial logics of capital, creativity, culture, and 
policy without privileging one among them’ (Curtin, 2009: 117). This is in contrast to 
accounts of the political economy of globalization that can approach the world as an 
undifferentiated market for corporate expansion without grounding a theory of media 
markets in cultural and historical geographies. It is also a valuable corrective to those 
approaches to creative cities and media capitals that treat industry clustering as simply a 
matter of mixing together a suitable set of ingredients (some tolerance and diversity here, 
some networking infrastructure there …) without recognizing the powerful economic, 
technological and historical forces that underpin the rise of media industry clusters in 
some places and not in others. In developing a critique of Playing to the World’s Biggest 
Audience, my aim is to identify some aspects of Curtin’s approach that can be refined 
further to move critical analysis forward, while recognizing the vital contribution this 
work has made to the development of cultural-economic geographies of global media.  
While Playing to the World’s Biggest Audience refers to the globalization of Chinese film 
and TV, it does not in fact demonstrate that this has occurred. While films such as 
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Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon had a significant impact in the cinema multiplexes 
around the world – and moved Chinese cinema out of circuits that can variously be 
described as cult, niche or art-house – it was still some way from achieving the box-office 
returns of Hollywood icons of the global-popular such as Star Wars, Titanic or the 
Terminator movies. Moreover, there has not really been a successor to Crouching Tiger 
as an Asian film achieving global box-office success, despite the heavy investments made 
in films such as Hero and House of Flying Daggers. Importantly, there is no evidence of 
a television program or television format coming from China, Hong Kong or Taiwan that 
has made a significant international impact, in contrast to Japanese formats such as anime 
and the Iron Chef series. This is not to say that the rise of the media industries and media 
markets of greater China are not a significant historical leitmotif of our times, or that they 
present significant regional challenges to the hegemony of global Hollywood; it is to say 
that they are some way off being directly competitive with the major global media 
conglomerates and the U.S.-based film and TV production studios. 
 
It may be the case that talking in terms of regionalization rather than globalization is 
more appropriate, as there is a significant line of argument among economists and 
economic geographers that much of the globalization literature is hubristic. Rugman 
(2000) and Krugman (1997) argued that the ‘pop internationalism’ literature of the 1990s 
overstated the capacity of corporations and investors to ‘go global’, while understating 
the cultural and policy barriers that exist to becoming genuinely global corporate entities, 
as distinct from those operating in geographically and culturally proximate nations and 
regions. Yet the regional focus throws into question the suitability of the framing of 
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cultural markets around a notion of shared Chineseness in terms of culture and ethnicity. 
Putting aside the myriad of political issues in the region (most notably between the 
People’s Republic of China and Taiwan), it is difficult for Curtin to locate Singapore 
within a geo-cultural conception of “greater China” since ‘Chinese cultural influences are 
relatively attenuated’ in Singapore, whereas Singapore sits more obviously in a South 
East Asian regional hub that includes Malaysia and Indonesia. It is also difficult to ignore 
the significance of Japanese and Korean media and cultural products in this regional 
market, which suggests that an alternative framing device is needed alongside China or 
Chineseness, such as Asian approaches to modernity (Straubhaar, 2008) or an East Asian 
popular culture consumed among young urban elites of the region (Chua, 2003).  Curtin 
acknowledges this problem in pointing out how ‘fantasies of a sprawling but organically 
coherent Chinese culture – a “greater China” – have faded as businesses have confronted 
the very difficult challenges of creating and promoting transnational products’ (Curtin, 
2007: 23).  
 
The final issue relates to the lack of policy coherence among the nation-states of the East 
Asian region. The differences between the media policies of the People’s Republic of 
China and the other countries in the region are substantial, and they create substantial 
difficulties for any pan-Asian regional media strategy that involves the incorporation of 
the Chinese market into expansion plans. The countries of the Asian region lack a more 
general set of unifying influences akin to the relationship between public service 
broadcasting and the political-economic space of the European Union, or the somewhat 
more tenuous links between the nations of South America based upon intersections 
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between culture, politics and historical geography. Thomas (2006) identifies eleven 
variables that are differentiating factors in the media and cultural policies of Asian 
nations, and there is no pan-regional driver akin to the European Union that acts to 
promote policy and regulatory harmonisation.  
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